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Abstract 
  This study investigates the determinants of the Five Eyes member 
governments’ responses towards the Confucius Institute. It is shown that 
countries took different positions based on its comprehensive threat analysis, 
including security and economic risks, from China. The results suggest that 
even within the Five Eyes security alliance, member states show a different 
level of security concerns towards China. This research used each 
government’s attitude towards the adoption of Huawei equipment for the 
rollout of the 5G network as a measurement to determine the level of the 
perceived security threat from China. This study first categorized each country 
into three groups using ‘the Huawei Barometer’ provided by Bloomberg and 
explain why and how the perceived level of security threat differs by analyzing 
the characteristics of its bilateral relationship with China. And the degree of 
containment towards the Confucius Institute was observed by reviewing law 
enactments, regular inspections, various governmental reports, media 
coverage, and collective actions taken by the public. The results suggest that 
the Five Eyes nations’ response to Confucius Institutes and perceived security 
threat represented as Huawei equipment adoption are positively correlated. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. Purpose of the Research 
  Confucius Institute is a non-profit public institution, established to 
promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries, which has 
benchmarked the success of various cultural centers such as British Council 
of the United Kingdom, Alliance Française of France and Goethe Institut of 
Germany. Confucius Institutes are funded by the Office of Chinese Language 
Council International (Hanban), an affiliated organization of the Ministry of 
Education. Unlike other cultural centers, Confucius Institutes usually are 
established inside universities, co-hosted by a partnering Chinese university. 
Each contract is made individually between partner schools under the 
guidance provided by Hanban. Hanban also provides half of the cost in the 
first year of the establishment. Since the first establishment in Seoul, South 
Korea 2004, Confucius Institutes have successfully proliferated worldwide. 
According to Hanban’s website, there are 525 Confucius Institutes globally; 
118 in Asia, 54 in Africa, 161 in the Americas, 173 in Europe, and 19 in 
Oceania.  
  Confucius Institute identifies itself as a Chinese language education 
center and a platform for cultural exchanges between China and hosting 
countries, aiming to build friendships and deepen cooperation. However, 
hosting governments show diverging views on the role of the organization as 
the number sharply increased over the past decade. While some nations view 
Confucius Institute as an excellent opportunity to develop its foreign language 
education and strengthen the bilateral relationship with China, some nations 
perceive it as Chinese propaganda with the suspicion that more significant 
influence of China in the education sector could lead to higher risk on their 
national security.   Such difference could be correlated to each hosting 
nation’s perceived security threat from China. This research will identify each 
nation’s degree of the perceived threat from China and how the threats are 
related to each government’s response towards the Confucius Institute.  
 
2. Literature Review 
  Previous works of literature on Confucius Institutes mainly focused on 
the soft power aspects of the organization, explaining the strategy of the 
Chinese government to construct a positive international image. Various 
comparative analyses with other cultural and language centers were conducted 
to compare the management method and program operation. Regarding 
hosting nation’s responses and the causes for the different attitudes were 
mainly categorized into three directions. First, studies focused on the inherent 
limitation of the Confucius Institute for being a state organization and how 
that contributes to forming concerns over academic freedom issues. Second, 
studies analyzed the way media has been portraying Confucius Institutes and 
the impacts of media in creating positive or negative perceptions of the public. 
Third, there were attempts to explain the correlation between Confucius 
Institutes and economic relationship with China. Studies calculated the degree 
of impact of the establishment of the Confucius Institute has on the bilateral 
economic relationships, and how the existing economic relationship impacts 
the attitudes of the nation towards Confucius Institutes.  
  First, studies explained the reasons why suspicion towards the Confucius 
Institute was created in the first place. According to Switzer, this perception 
was formed because of the unique aspect of the Confucius Institute. As 
Confucius Institutes partner with and reside in existing academic institutions, 
universities are more likely to be under the Chinese government’s influence, 
receiving funding, teachers, and teaching materials from Hanban (Switzer 
2017). These resources provided by the Chinese government can be attractive 
to cash strapped universities facing struggles to provide high-quality Chinese 
language education for students. With academic institutions being dependent 
on the money from the Chinese government, academics and students believe 
that it will be difficult for the school to maintain its academic freedom even 
when there is no direct interference from Hanban (Luqiu and McCarthy 2018). 
For instance, The Toronto District School Board, the largest public school in 
Canada terminated its relationship with the Confucius Institute after a massive 
protest organized by academics and parents. The collective actions were taken 
after the evidence of Chinese government interference were identified, which 
was restricting the critical discussion of sensitive topics such as the status of 
Tibet and Taiwan or the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. The research mentioned 
that the attempts of Confucius Institutes to shape a positive image of China 
collided with the spirit of a Canadian university to promote freedom of thought 
and expression (Wu 2017) 
  Second, researches focused on the influence of the media coverage on 
the formation of the public’s perception towards the Confucius Institute. Luqiu 
and MacCarthy explain the way U.S. media frame the cooperation between 
Hanban and U.S. universities and how it is highly relevant to the legitimacy 
given to the Confucius Institutes. The paper mentioned the importance of 
media framing because of its effects on how people understand and evaluate 
specific issues and analyzed how it can be applied to explain the case of 
Confucius Institutes. When media focused on the negative aspects of 
cooperation, such as doubts about the institute’s legal legitimacy or the 
potential harm to academic integrity, more negative reactions were created 
from the public, making it more difficult for universities to host the Confucius 
Institutes. Contrarily, when the media paid more attention to the positive or 
neutral aspects of Confucius Institutes, less resistance was found in accepting 
Hanban’s offers. It was also noted as a contributing factor in the closure of the 
Confucius Institute of the University of Chicago, which occurred after the 
negative newspaper coverage on the Congressional hearings about Confucius 
Institutes (Luqiu and McCarthy 2018). 
  Another study by Leuk, Pipps, and Lin analyzed the New York Times 
reports on Confucius Institutes. The study shows the history of the coverage 
and how the characteristics of the coverage changed over the past years 
evolved. In the initial periods of the Confucius Institutes establishments, the 
New York Times had minimal coverage. However, in the following five years, 
the New York Times started to use the typical Western stereotype on viewing 
Confucius Institute alongside other U.S. presses (Leuk, Pipps and Lin 2014). 
Lim has compared the media coverage about China in South Korea with that 
of the New York Times, saying that the U.S. press is using the political and 
ideological framework which disturbs creating a positive image on Confucius 
Institutes. He mentioned that because South Korean domestic newspapers are 
free from the influence of particular ideological framework, perception on 
Confucius Institutes could be maintained positive and neutral in South Korea 
(Lim 2017).   
  Third, studies focused on the economic effects of the Confucius 
Institutes and how they are correlated with the economic trade volume or 
foreign direct investments. Literature analyzed both sides of the causal 
relationship, looking into the economic benefits that Confucius Institutes 
might bring, and how the attitudes towards Confucius Institutes differ by the 
hosting country’s level of economic dependence to China. Lien, Oh and 
Selmier used the gravity model to analyze the influence of Confucius Institutes 
on outward trade, and FDI flows from China, which was the first paper to 
examine the relationship of economics and soft power initiative. They have 
found significant increases in both Chinese exports and FDI in developing 
countries through the establishment of Confucius Institutes, but less or no 
discernable change for developed Anglo-American economies (Lien, Oh and 
Selmier 2011).  
  Using the same gravity model, Lien, Lo and Bojanic conducted another 
study comparing the economic effects among different language and cultural 
center including Goethe Institut, Instituto Cervantes, and Confucius Institute. 
Out of the three institutes, Confucius Institute had the least impact on 
increasing trade and FDI, almost one third the effect of Goethe Institut. They 
pointed out the cultural disparity as a substantial contributing factor on why 
the Chinese government has not been as successful as the German Goethe 
Institut and Spanish Instituto Cervantes (Lien, Lo and Bojanic 2018).  
  Hsiao and Yang compared the Confucius Institute in Southeast Asia in 
relation to economic dependency and security relationship. The study 
analyzed that economic dependency had less importance on the establishment 
of the Confucius Institute, saying how economic incentives were merely a 
contributing factor. Furthermore, the study highlighted the importance of how 
government and public perceive China, stating that government-to-
government and society-to-society ties between China might be more critical 
in the establishment of the Confucius Institute. The paper provides a case 
study of Myanmar, which has preferred to engage rather passively towards 
establishing the Confucius Institute in its country. Despite being highly 
dependent economically, the government of Myanmar had doubts on the 
institutes, perceiving Confucius Institute as a security threat to the regime 
viewing it as great external propaganda. Myanmar government was afraid it 
might reinforce the influence of local ethnic Chinese and challenge its own 
authority (Hsiao and Yang 2014).  
  As shown in previous literature, there were efforts to explain the 
responses Confucius Institute was receiving and to find the determinants for 
the difference. When analyzing the diverging responses from hosting nation’s 
governments, most studies conducted case studies by grouping western 
nations into one category and compared it to developing nations. Studies 
analyzed how western countries as a whole was viewing Confucius Institute 
negatively while developing countries are on the favorable category. Different 
degrees of attitudes were found among these Anglo-American nations. This 
paper will delve into these differences. 
 
3. Scope and Methodology 
 This research will analyze the member nations of the Five Eyes, which is the 
joint intelligence cooperation composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, to compare the different responses 
towards Confucius Institute. The Five Eyes member states were selected in 
this research to control variables such as cultural dissimilarity with China and 
economic development status, which were identified as major contributing 
factors to explain the different response to Confucius Institute. With such 
factors controlled, the primary visible factor that could influence responses is 
the perceived security threat from China as can be seen from Hsiao and Yang’s 
Myanmar case.  
  The adoption of Huawei equipment in the rollout of a 5G network is used 
as a barometer to measure the level of the perceived security threat from China. 
The concerns on Huawei and its possible threat to national security have been 
an ongoing issue in many countries as a series of reports suggested that 
Huawei equipment had a backdoor to collect confidential data and could 
possibly share it with the Chinese government. Such accusation on Huawei 
was amplified since Chinese law requires organizations and citizens to support, 
assist and cooperate with intelligence work, which can make Huawei's 
equipment a conduit for espionage (Slezak and Bogle 2018). Even though 
Huawei has denied the accusation that it poses a national security risk, 
cybersecurity issues around Huawei and its alleged links to the Chinese 
Communist Party and its military still remains.  
  Five countries will be classified into three groups according to the stance 
each government is taking towards Huawei equipment adoption. The three 
levels of stances are 'ban in effect,' 'likely to ban' and 'on the fence,' that is 
from the Huawei Barometer provided by Bloomberg (Nicola 2019). Each 
nation's government response to the Confucius Institutes will then be 
measured and observed whether it is positively correlated to the actions taken 
in response to Huawei inclusion.  
  To measure the degree of perceptions towards both Confucius Institute 
and security threat, we have analyzed documents and reports from various 
sources, including white papers, new paper articles, and academic papers. This 
research puts the highest authority to the publications and actions taken by the 
government in determining the level of threat. 
  
II. Five Eyes’ Response 
 
1. Five Eyes Network 
  The member states take a diverging position on security towards China, 
even though the Five Eyes is a robust security intelligence-sharing alliance. 
To explain this divergence, to understand the network dimension of the five 
eyes alliance and bringing international relations perspective on the analysis 
should be preceded.    
  The Five Eyes network is an asymmetric form of alliance, with the 
United States being the leading partner, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
take the role as junior partners to Washington, distinct from the United 
Kingdom who’s established global intelligence capabilities and historical role 
in Europe make it more of a senior partner in the network. Junior members 
participate in this alliance to maximize the gains they receive by being allied 
to stronger members while seniors exert their influence (O’Neil 2017). 
  Historically, junior allies often found themselves bending towards the 
will of the major powers, but there were some occasions which they took 
different foreign policy choices from the senior allies. In instances where the 
policy decisions are at odds with their sovereign interests and create 
vulnerability, member countries took diverging measures from their allies. For 
example, Canada and New Zealand chose not to participate in the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq although both countries had access to the same intelligence 
source from the network that was mostly gathered by the U.K. and US. On the 
other hand, Australia chose to join the US-led coalition with many other 
reasons, not least the quest for FTA with the United States (O'Neil 2017). 
  It is shown that under the situation that could bring significant security 
risks or substantial economic benefits to their sovereign interest, individual 
member states calculate whether the benefits to the country exceeds the costs 
they have to assume to come up with the most appropriate policy decision. 
This is also noticed within the specific measures on recent Huawei equipment 
adoption on the rollout of the 5G network, which became controversial with 
suspicion on Chinese espionage. 
  We will first analyze why and how the individual five eyes members are 
taking such positions on this issue by explaining the characteristics of the 
relationship each nation has with China. In addition, the response to the 
Confucius Institute will be explained in detail. By looking at the position, each 
government takes on Huawei equipment adoption and Confucius Institute; this 
study will be able to capture the relationship between the perceived security 
threat and response towards the Confucius Institute.   
2. Ban in Effect 
 
1-1. United States 
1-1-1. Response to China 
  The United States is at the center of the movement of banning Huawei 
equipment for the rollout of the 5G network. The Trump administration has 
been persuading other countries, including the Five Eyes and its allies 
throughout Asia and Europe, from adopting Huawei’s equipment. U.S. 
government emphasized the dangers of the equipment as the Chinese 
government could use it for espionage purposes. U.S. Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo has warned explicitly that U.S. government might hold back 
intelligence-sharing with NATO allies and the Five Eyes nations if they choose 
to use Huawei equipment for 5G network infrastructures (Wroughton, Szakacs 
2019). Furthermore, the Trump administration added Huawei to a Commerce 
Department blacklist on May 17, requiring U.S. companies to consist an 
exclusive license to sell their product to Huawei along with limiting Huawei 
to buy the parts from U.S. companies. Qualcomm, Intel Corp., Google, and 
others soon announced to freeze the supplies of critical software and 
components to Huawei, which could retard the rollout of 5G networks 
worldwide. Slow down caused by the blacklist is considered to be crucial for 
Huawei as it could possibly work to change the decisions of the countries that 
have been planning to adopt Huawei equipment (Donnan 2019).  
  United States government officials and industry have long been 
concerned about Chinese espionage in general and Huawei’s role in particular 
as non-traditional information collectors that serve the Chinese government’s 
military and strategic ambitions. Those concerns were first introduced by the 
report in 2012 by the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
which warned U.S. companies against using equipment made by Chinese 
telecom companies, tagging Huawei and ZTE Corp. According to the report, 
Huawei did not fully cooperate with the investigation and was unwilling to 
explain its relationship with the government, while credible evidence exists 
that Huawei fails to comply with U.S. laws.  
  The report also highlighted Huawei’s corporate history, suggesting its 
ties to the military, mentioning the background of Ren Zhengfei, the founder 
of Huawei in 1987, who also served in the People’s Liberation Army as an 
engineer. In 2018, another bill was passed to ban phones made by both Huawei 
and ZTE Corp. in U.S. government agencies. The government also suggested 
that companies who want to do business with the government in the future 
should cut their own Huawei ties (Reuters 2018). Soon after the ban, Sabrina 
Meng Wanzhou, the CFO and daughter of its founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei 
was arrested in Vancouver in December 2018. She was alleged for lying to 
U.S. banks in order to clear the transaction with Iran, violating American 
sanctions on Iran (Rapoza 2019). Huawei had repeatedly been denying U.S.’s 
doubt on Huawei as a potential security threat, helping Beijing spy on other 
governments or corporations. Huawei pointed out that there is no proof to 
support such charges that Huawei is working for the espionage of the Chinese 
government. 
  The Huawei ban could be explained by a decade prolonged escalation of 
security tension between the U.S. and China. In November 2011, then U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had announced a U.S. "Pivot" to Asia, in her 
essay for Foreign Policy. This marked a start of new excellent power 
competition since the end of the Cold War. Since then, the U.S.-China relations 
underwent a fundamental change in commerce to the South China Sea. Since 
his inauguration in January 2017, President Donald Trump vowed to modify 
existing unfair U.S.-China relations, especially in the field of trade. In 
accordance with his promises, President Trump has imposed a tariff to ignite 
trade negotiation to bring concessions from China. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government increased military presence by establishing Indo-Pacific 
Command and enhanced military budget and capability and approached to 
nations to rally against China and its Belt and Road Initiative.  
  The recent escalation of the U.S.-China tension could be seen as the 
result of President Trump’s own initiative since authoritative documents and 
papers by the executive branch explicitly state the current administration's 
hawkish stance against China. Updated National Security Strategy (NSS) 
published under White House, National Defense Strategy (NDS) by 
Department of Defense, and United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) 
annual special 301 report also contain hawkish statements toward China. 
However, this attitude was not limited to the White House. Despite suffering 
from an unseen level of divisive politics, the Capitol also had shown bipartisan 
support for current China Policy, which is notable as Democrats have been 
showing consistent opposition towards President Trump’s major policies and 
commitments.  
  Two leaders of Democrats, the Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, 
and the Speaker of the U.S. House Representative Nancy Pelosi are also China 
Hawks. Senator Chuck Schumer has been referred to as the closest Democratic 
ally of President Trump's tariff policy (Everett and Caygle 2019). Senator 
Schumer referred to China as ‘the great danger’ and emphasized the needs to 
strengthen the coordination against China by modifying current multifront 
tariff strategy (Everett and Caygle 2019). Speaker Pelosi agreed to President 
Trump’s action, saying that something needs to be done (Rapoza 2018). She 
also made a Press Release in March 2018, criticizing China’s unfair trade 
policies including ‘Made in China 2025’ and endorsed Trump 
Administration’s New Tariff on China (Pelosi 2018). Many Democrats in 
House and Senates also join the president’s China Policy, despite their concern 
for bipartisan cover (Everett and Caygle 2019).   
  Moreover, the bipartisan support against China can also be inferred from 
the annual reports by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (USCC). The USCC is the commission founded to submit annual 
reports on the national security implication and recommendation regarding the 
U.S.-China Relations to Congress for both legislative and administrative 
action. Its members are composed of 12 members including Majority and 
Minority Leaders or Speaker from both Senates and House, who represents 
both sides of the political spectrum. In its 2018 Report to Congress, the 
commission made a comprehensive review on China encompassing U.S-
China Economic, trade and Security relations, China's foreign policy and 
initiatives and China's high-tech development. Through the analysis, the 
commission made 26 recommendations, including ten key recommendations 
with particular significance, highly resembling President Trump’s policies and 
rhetoric.  
  Recommendations were made to USTR to identify the possible trade-
distorting practices by China. It also directed the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) to find details of existing facilities built through Belt and 
Road Initiative. The report also made recommendations to the Congress to 
request the Office of Management and Budget's Information Security Officer 
to prepare an annual report including existing departmental procurement and 
security policies and guidance on cyber and data security, which could affect 
IT, IoT, and 5G networks. In addition, the report requested the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal 
Communications Commission to focus on the security threat posed by the 
equipment and services manufactured from China and to identify potential 
statutory authorities to ensure the security of the domestic 5G network (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018). These specific 
recommendations are aligned with president Trump’s policy, particularly its 
effort to ban and investigate Huawei for security reasons.   
  Such consensus between the executive and legislative branches on the 
security threats from China is expected to extend the ongoing disputes 
between the U.S. and China.  In response to the U.S.’s action, the Chinese 
government is bracing for a more protracted fight. According to Financial 
Times, On May 20, 2019, Chinese movies on the Korean War, "War to Resist 
America and Aid Korea," were released during the primetime on the state 
television. Furthermore, on May 22, President Xi called for a ‘New Long 
March’  (Li and Chen 2019), a reference to the desperate journey that Red 
Army took under Mao’s leadership. There are views predicting that Beijing is 
waiting for Trump’s defeat in Next year’s presidential election hoping for a 
favorable negotiation with Democrats. However, it is unlikely for Democrats 
to be more lenient with China.  
  According to Pew Research Center, in 2017, both Democrats and 
Republicans had stronger concerns for cyber attacks from China, 60% of 
Republicans and 55% for Democrats, suggesting that security issues could 
continue to hinder the bilateral relations. Democratic candidates for 2020 
presidential election, including Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth 
Warren, share a hawkish view towards China with President Trump. All 
candidates have shown consensus on the idea that China should be contained 
(D. Scott 2019).  
  In accordance with the perceived threat from China, Trump 
administration requested universities to join the anti-Huawei movement and 
took measures to scrutinize Huawei’s research collaboration with American 
universities. In recent years, Huawei has been building partnerships and joint 
centers for high-end research with universities around the world, especially in 
North America and Europe. Huawei Innovation Research Program (HIRP) had 
covered 300 universities worldwide with 1200 project funding (Sharma 2019). 
The research topics included artificial intelligence, deep learning, machine 
learning, computer vision, natural language processing, and reinforcement 
learning, which all have essential future military applications (WHOTMP 
2018). 
  The 'Protect Our University Act' was introduced in February 2019, to 
establish a task force led by the US Department of Education to create a list 
of researches of such topics. The act also called for the intelligence director to 
create a list of foreign entities that pose a threat of espionage and stipulates 
that Huawei be included. Schools including, Stanford University, University 
of California’s flagship Berkeley campus and other schools made their 
decisions to join the movement and cut ties with Huawei on HIRP. Princeton 
cut new funding ties with Huawei, and the University of Minnesota cut ties 
with both Huawei and Confucius Institute (Yu 2019).  
 
1-1-2. Confucius Institutes 
  The United States has the largest number of Confucius Institutes than 
any other country. According to the Hanban Website, there are 105 Confucius 
Institutes and 501 Confucius classrooms located in 44 of the 50 states. The 
first U.S. Confucius Institute was opened at the University of Maryland in 
2004. The Confucius Institutes in the United States are supported by 
Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS) in Washington D.C. According to 
CIUS, its goal is to provide resources and supports to school districts that wish 
to develop a Chinese language curriculum. It also gives professional 
development opportunities to teachers in U.S. Confucius Institutes. Hanban 
opened CIUS in 2013 and designated CIUS as its overseas representative in 
the U.S. CIUS received suspicion on its role as an organization that conducts 
surveillance on Confucius Institutes, but CIUS identifies itself as a subsidiary 
organization without any authority in individual Confucius Institutes.  
  In 2018, the CIA issued a classified report on China's influence operation 
in the U.S., with a section dedicated to Confucius Institute, warning that China 
is using financial incentives to permeate universities as a way of promoting a 
positive view of Beijing and deterring research that could cast China in a 
negative way. USCC has also warned the danger of the Confucius Institutes 
as an essential platform for a more extensive program to increase China’s soft 
power, advancing Beijing’s version of history. The commission also 
mentioned that China is actively carrying out international propaganda battles 
to combat Western and other foreign narratives. According to the report, 
Confucius Institute has been documented to eliminate topics that deemed 
threats to the stability of Chinese government rule (USCC 2018).  
  In addition, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
was passed in August 2018. A new requirement says that no institutions 
receiving funding from the Pentagon can host a Confucius Institute. 
University of Minnesota, Indiana University and Rhode Island have already 
closed its institute because its credit-bearing Chinese Language Flagship 
Program is financed by the Defense Department and many more universities 
are expected to cut the ties due to this amendment. Three more universities in 
April 2019 announced their plan to close the Confucius Institutes. San 
Francisco State University, the University of Oregon and Western Kentucky 
University said that the Department of Defense declined their requests for 
waivers that would allow them to continue to operate both programs (Redden 
2019). There are more universities that are under this situation, such as the 
University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Arizona State University. They have both 
confirmed their request for waivers were denied, but have not made concrete 
decisions yet. They are in the process of finding other options. 
  In 2019, United States Senate released a report condemning Confucius 
Institute. The report was issued by the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs calling for stringent controls to be placed on these 
centers. The report warned that the Confucius Institutes should be closed 
unless they are overhauled. The report has pointed out the transparency issue 
as a problem to fix. These include the visa reviews on Chinese teachers that 
are selected by China, and revealing unspecified and spending and bylaws 
online. Since 2017, the State Department issued four Letters of Concern to 
U.S. schools to find inappropriately used J-1 visas related to the Confucius 
Institutes and revoked 32 visas for Confucius Institute exchange visitors. The 
State Department has conducted two field site reviews of Confucius Institute 
in 2018 in response to this visa violation and is planning to double the visit, 
conducting four field site reviews in 2019.  
  The first closure of the Confucius Institutes in the U.S. was taken 
independent of the government intervention. The University of Chicago 
announced in September 2014 that it would not be renewing its contract, citing 
a statement made by Xu Lin, the Hanban’s Director General as the reason for 
the split. During the early stages, the closing of the Confucius Institutes was 
mainly due to the criticism from the academics similar to the cases in Canada. 
In early 2014, more than 100 professors at school signed a petition requesting 
the closure of its Confucius Institute, mentioning the universities’ lack of 
controls over the hiring and training of Confucius Institute teachers. Also, 
Pennsylvania State University ended the relationship, with the dean of the 
school's College of the Liberal Arts remarked in a written statement that 
"several of our goals are not consistent with those of Hanban." Later in 2018, 
four other universities, including Texas A&M University closed, due to the 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act as mentioned 
previously. The timeline below shows all of the U.S. schools that have closed 
their Confucius Institute. 
 
  Collective actions against Confucius Institutes were taken earlier than 
the government. The American Association of University Professors (AUUP) 
has released an official statement criticizing Confucius Institutes in 2014. The 
AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure recommended that 
universities cease their involvement in Confucius Institute unless they can 
2014




•University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
2018
•Texas A&M University, Prairie Veiw A&M University, University of West 
Florida, University of Iowa
2019
•Uni. of North Florida, North Carolina State University, Uni.of Michigan, Uni of 
Rhode Island, Uni of Minnesota-Twin Cities, Uni. of South Florida, UMass  
Boston, Indiana University
renegotiate the contracts. AUUP has described the relationship as “partnership 
that sacrificed the integrity of the university and its academic staff.” In case 
universities still chose to host Confucius Institute, AAUP set fort three criteria 
that should meet before they form the contract: 1) renegotiate the contract to 
ensure the university enjoys "unilateral control", consistent with principles 
articulated in the AAUP's Statement on Government of Colleges and 
Universities, overall academic matters, including recruitment of teachers, 
determination of curriculums and choice of texts; 2) ensure that Confucius 
Institute teachers enjoy the same academic freedom rights as all other faculty 
members, as defined in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure; and 3) make the university’s agreement with the Hanban 
“available to all members of the university community” in order to promote 
transparency (AAUP 2014). 
  The National Association of Scholars also published a report 
“Outsourced to China- Confucius Institute and Soft Power in American Higher 
Education” in 2017 (Peterson 2017). The organization has gathered concerns 
from the academia on the external threat on academic freedom and conducted 
case studies at twelve Confucius Institutes in New Jersey and New York. The 
report categorized the causes for concerns in four areas, including intellectual 
freedom, transparency, entanglement, and soft power and ended the report by 
recommending all universities to close their Confucius Institutes. In case the 
colleges or university refuses to close the relationship, NAS has recommended 
the faculty and administration to push the reforms including the requirement 
that all Confucius Institutes to offer at least one public lecture or class each 
year on the topics that are important in Chinese history that are currently 
neglected, such as the Tiananmen Square protests or the Dalai Lama's views 
on Tibet. NAS recommended that these lectures should be free from external 
pressure, fair and balanced (Peterson 2017).  
  However, some universities professors said the relationship with 
Confucius Institute is positive, and there are no concerns over academic 
freedom. Some of the schools have included noninterference on academic 
freedom in their written contracts and assured that there was no sign of the 
Chinese Government's influence over the selection of the topics that were 
dealt in the classes. Many teachers said they were free to use any materials of 
their own and there was no interference on that. However, NAS claims even 
though there were no signs of direct interference from the organization found, 
schools will not be free from the self-censorship issues unless universities are 





1-2-1. Response to China 
  Australia is the only member of the Five Eyes, apart from the U.S., to 
ban the use of Huawei equipment in the rollout of 5G infrastructure over 
national security concerns. While other Five Eyes countries have not made 
definite public statements on the exclusion of Huawei equipment, the Federal 
Government said it would be interpreting the Telecommunications Sector 
Security Reforms (TSSR) reform announced in 2017 to disqualify any 
company that was “likely subject to extrajudicial direction from a foreign 
government that conflict with Australian law”. The TSSR came to an effect on 
September 2018 and included a security obligation requiring vendors to 
protect their networks against threats to national security (Skezak and Bogle 
2018).  
  In the statement from Prime Minister Scott Morrison, then Home Affairs 
Minister, and Senator Mitch Fifield confirmed that carriers might be restricted 
from buying equipment from companies operating in certain countries (Finley 
2018). The statement did not explicitly name Huawei or China, but Huawei 
Australia confirmed by Twitter that it had been told by the Government that it 
would be banned. The company also mentioned that it is an extremely 
disappointing result for customers, saying it has 'safely and securely delivered 
wireless technology in Australia for close to 15 years (Skezak et al. 2018).' 
  After the government’s announcement, economic retaliation was 
followed by China. Dalian has reported restricting coal imports from Australia. 
Even though Chinese government said the inspections for coal imports were 
for environmental purposes, with China having the history of using trade as 
leverage, banning import is interpreted as another signal of China pressuring 
Australia regarding the 5G network rollout. China’s foreign ministry also did 
not say it was specifically targeting Australia, but Australia is the world’s 
largest coal exporter, and it accounts for more than 20% of China’s coal 
imports, making Australia an obvious target (Scott and Murtaugh 2019) 
  Although there is a certain degree of economic risk it has to assume, the 
Australian government did not reverse their decision on excluding Huawei. 
This was not difficult to predict, because when the Australian government was 
forced to choose between the two, it had shown a tendency to choose security 
over the economy, as security also plays an integral role in ensuring the health 
of the economy. Geographically, due to the inhospitable landscape, Australia 
has a small population compared to its size, therefore unable to create a self-
sufficient domestic market. In addition, it has a very long coastline, which 
limits its military capabilities. Australia had to both secure sea routes and 
spurred economic activity through trade. While China was the largest trading 
partner (export 85B USD) in 2017, Australia still had, U.S. (import 20.5B 
USD), Japan (export 34.6B USD) and India (export 14.8B USD) within its 
security alliance to fall back on, to compensate the economic risks caused by 
China (Fedirka 2018). Under these geopolitical circumstances, security 
awareness had grown more prominent in 2010 when China was pushing its 
power over the territorial claims in the South China Sea. US Marines in 
Darwin was endorsed in 2011, making an even stronger commitment to the 
U.S.’s emerging military strategy in Asia (Ayson 2012). 
  For example, Australia participated in the re-established Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue involving the U.S., Japan and India since 2017 and Defense 
Minister Christopher Pyne highlighted the needs to resolve disputes in the 
South China Sea to military leaders in Singapore during the 2019 Fullerton 
Forum. Along with forming a stronger military alliance to protect the trade 
routes, the government sought to expand their defense capability by 
announcing to invest 90 billion AUD in the Royal Australian Navy and plans 
to grow its defense budget to over two percent of its GDP by 2021 (Medcalf 
2019).   
  Australia’s 2017 foreign policy white paper also explicitly states its 
influence and economic opportunities in Papua New Guinea, other Pacific 
states and Timor-Leste, and recognizes to counter ‘increasing competition' and 
‘growing aid and loans from other sources' that could ‘strain the capacity of 
countries to absorb assistance and manage their debt levels'. The statement 
considered to be directed against China and can be interpreted as an attempt 
to reassert Australia’s influence in the region. 
  Within the Five Eyes alliance, Australia has shared the burden in the area 
of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Indonesia, southern China, and the nations 
in Indo China. Such roles are divided between the members in accordance 
with their national priorities (Richelson 2012). According to Snowden 
disclosures, most of the collaboration between Australian Signals Directorate 
and the National Security Agency has focused on China and Indonesia 
encompassing military and political intelligence gathering as well as 
economic espionage. The Australian government has made significant policy 
decisions influenced by the U.S. intelligence assessment, as being allied to a 
stronger military power is perceived as the alliance’s most important benefit 
for Australia.  
  This explains how, even within the Five Eyes network, Australia had 
been paying more attention to the security threat from China in particular, and 
how the government had been working within the alliance, more like the 
country’s bilateral intelligence relationship with the U.S., rather than the equal 
engagement with other partners. (O’Neil 2017). In the 2017 government 
foreign policy white paper, the government explicitly stated that the alliance 
with the U.S. is central to Australia and that without active U.S. political 
economic and security engagement, it will be more difficult for Australia to 
achieve the level of the security and stability they seek (Whitepaper 2017).  
  The decision made by the Australian government on banning Huawei 
from 5G network building had been influenced significantly by the U.S.’s 
request, but the government had also taken independent actions to contend 
Huawei before for their own security concerns. In 2012, the country blocked 
Huawei from tendering contracts for its 38B AUD National Broadband 
Network (NBN) citing cyber security concerns (Horwitz 2018). The decision 
to ban Huawei in the involvement of NBN building was not changed even 
after the change of the government from the previous Labor government to 
conservative government in 2013 (Yueyang 2013). This proves the security 
concerns on Huawei are bipartisan and solid. 
  The Australian government has interfered in the Solomon Islands 
contract with Huawei as well. In 2016, Huawei won the contract to build the 
4000km underwater cable connecting the Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, and Australia (Horwitz 2018). It made Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs offer to run a new tender and to pay for two-thirds of the link 
if Huawei was excluded. The decision of the government cost Australia’s 
foreign aid budget upwards 100 million AUD (Chirgwin 2018). Despite the 
high costs they had to assume, the Australian government signed the contract. 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced that “We offered them an alternative 
to an undersea cable project; we believe is cheaper, faster, more reliable than 
the competitor” (Chirgwin 2018).  
  To counter the suspicion on reliability, Huawei Australia also made a 
statement on Solomon Island undersea cable in August 2017, through their 
website. Huawei rejected the allegations and announced that there is no basis 
in fact, and Huawei has never given, implied, nor promised any political 
donations in relation to the project (Hooley 2017). Also, Huawei tried to 
explain that it is not involved with politics and cybersecurity remains a top 
priority in all of their business projects and remains open to working with 
governments and industry to address global cyber security challenges together 
(Hooley 2017). Despite their effort, Huawei failed to participate in the 
underwater cable project, becoming another example of showing how 




1-2-2. Confucius Institutes 
  According to Hanban Web page, there are 14 Confucius Institutes on 
Australian university campuses and 67 Confucius Classrooms. Confucius 
Institutes operates following the guideline provided by Hanban, and provide 
Chinese classes to the University. Not only the students but the wider 
community takes credit of the courses. The institute organizes cultural 
performances, public lectures, speech competitions and exchange programs 
with partner universities in China. Confucius Institutes also organize 
translating and interpreting services, administer Chinese language proficiency 
test, coordinate language competitions, and arrange study tours to China. The 
activities are quite identical to the other Confucius Institutes, while some 
Confucius Institutes conduct individual courses. For example, the Queensland 
University of Technology in Brisbane focuses on professional development 
for teachers and supports Chinese language and culture education in schools. 
Also, Griffith University on the Gold Coast, the institute focuses on language 
and culture training for tourism. The Confucius Institute at RMIT University 
in Melbourne mainly teaches Chinese medicine (Gil 2019). 
  The view on Confucius Institute is very similar to that of the United 
States, believing there is high risk in the relationship. Looking at how the 
Australian government is being highly dependent on the bilateral relationship 
with the U.S. on security alliance, the attitude towards the Confucius Institute 
is aligned with policy decisions it has made on Huawei, represented as the 
equipment of Chinese espionage. In addition, concerns over Chinese influence 
on tertiary education have been escalated due to the continuous increase of 
Chinese students.  
  By 2017, a number of international students recorded 753,000 and 
380,000 of them in tertiary studies and numbers are growing continuously. In 
several universities, such as University of Sydney, Melbourne University, 
UNSW, Monash University, and RMIT, international students make up nearly 
forty percent of the student body, with over a third of total revenue derived 
from their tuition fees. Chinese students consist of 30 percent of all students. 
Thus the concerns on being overly reliant on China was escalated as it was 
perceived as putting Australia’s education at risk of political and economic 
repercussions. The government received criticism from the public and 
academia because they had been gradually cutting the funding to universities 
over decades, making universities to rely on Chinese student’s fees to support 
their operation (Burton-Bradley 2018).  
  With criticism towards the government about Chinese influence over the 
education industry, the Australian government has taken direct steps to 
monitor the Confucius Institutes. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme 
Act was commenced in December 2018, with its purpose to provide the public 
and government decision-makers with visibility of the nature, level, and extent 
of foreign influence on Australia's government and political process (DFAT 
2018). According to the website, the scheme introduces registration 
obligations for persons and entities who have arrangements with, and 
undertake certain activities on behalf of, foreign principals. Moreover, it 
reports that whether a person or entity is required to register will depend on 
whom the foreign principal is, the nature of the activities undertaken, the 
purpose for which the activities are undertaken, and in some cases, whether 
the person has held a senior public position in Australia (DFAT 2018). It has 
been reported that the Attorney General's Department has written to 
universities that host Confucius Institutes, asking them to register the institutes 
under the scheme (Gil 2019). 
  The inspection has been projected to Confucius Classrooms as well. In 
May 2018, The New South Wales Government decided to review the 
Confucius Classroom program amid claims it could expose children to 
propaganda. A spokesman for Education Minister Rob Stokes confirmed that 
Chinese Government-funded travel program for NSW school principals had 
been postponed and the Government was now investigating Confucius 
Classrooms due to the raised concerns. The spokesman said "The Department 
of Education's relationship with the Confucius Institute is currently under 
review to ensure that there are no inappropriate influences from foreign 
powers," and “It would be inappropriate to comment further until this review 
has concluded.” (Gerathy and Kozaki 2018) 
  Before these recent government measures, a critical debate of these 
institutions has occurred primarily among academics (Kwok 2018). The most 
common criticisms raised during the early phases on the establishment of the 
Confucius Institutes were on a threat to academic freedom. In 2007, Jocelyn 
Chey, a visiting professor at the University of Sydney, was one of the first 
academics to take a critical public stance to Confucius Institutes. She warned 
that if Confucius Institutes were responsible for research as part of the 
university's mainstream activities, this would lead to a “dumbing down” of 
research or even to the production of propaganda supportive of the Chinese 
government (Kwok 2018).  
  Also, John Fitzgerald of Swinburne University of technology warned 
that allowing the establishment of a Confucius Institutes on campus is in itself 
an unacceptable compromise. He said, "It marks a breach in the battlefront 
with Western liberal values." It is difficult to identify any specific evidence 
and instances where a Confucius Instituted has overstepped its boundaries. In 
Australia, no case of infringement upon academic freedom has been publicly 
reported, but the Australian government has been keeping their eyes on the 
institute with the suspicion that more significant influence of China in the 
education sector could lead to higher risk on their national security (Kwok 
2018). 
 




1-1-1. Response to China 
  The Canadian government is still reviewing its policy on procurement 
contracts in the communications and IT sector, whether to ban on Huawei 
competing for 5G(Sharma 2019). Canada was expected to move more quickly 
in banning Huawei, with the U.S. wanting its allies to restrict the firm. 
However, Canada declined to speculate on when a decision would be made 
(Bloomberg 2019). According the spokesman for Ralph Goodell, Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency, the government is carefully assessing the 
security challenges and potential threats involved in future 5G technologies, 
while recognizing the potential it holds for Canadians and that will be taking 
appropriate decisions in due course to ensure that our networks are kept safe 
for Canadians (Wingrove 2019). The government is carefully deciding the 
timing of any announcement as Canada has been at diplomatic odds with 
China after the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei in Vancouver on 
an American extradition request since December 2018 (Leigh and Li 2019). 
  Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is expected to delay the decision as long 
as possible to avoid jeopardizing two Canadians detained in China appears to 
be retaliation for the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. Michael Kovrig, a former 
diplomat who was detained while visiting Beijing, was arrested on suspicion 
of “gathering state secrets and intelligence for abroad,” and Michael Spavor, 
a business consultant who was detained in northeastern China, was accused of 
“stealing and providing state secrets for abroad.”In May 2019, these two 
Canadians were formally arrested on espionage. Following the diplomatic 
tensions, economic tensions were triggered between the two countries. China 
has halted shipments of 2.7B CAD worth of Canadian canola oilseeds they 
bought from Canada in 2018, saying they were contaminated (Buckley and 
Hernandex and Bilefsky 2019). China buys typically 40 percent of Canada’s 
canola seeds, one of the key Canadian products, leaving Canadian farmers 
facing stockpiles of oilseeds with a falling price. Soybeans have piled along 
with canola, after the deterioration of relationship (Powell 2019). Furthermore, 
20 percent of Canadian companies have been negatively impacted by the 
ongoing dispute between the two countries (CCBS 2019). The Canadian 
government has double the canola aid loans to one million CAD to help the 
farmers (Powell 2019). However, the fundamental resolution to the heightened 
economic tension is far-fetched.   
  Canada’s major telecommunication industry is expected to be negatively 
influenced by the ban as well. For the past decade, Huawei has been somewhat 
successful in Canada, unlike in the United States and Australia. Its equipment 
is used in telecommunications infrastructure run by the country's major 
carriers, and some have sold Huawei's phones (Braga 2018). Out of the three 
major telecommunication companies, Telus Corp. and BCE Inc.’s Bell Canada 
are most heavily invested with Huawei and will be profoundly impacted by 
the government’s announcement. Rogers Communication is only one out of 
the three to be free from the decision, as it uses Ericsson AB of Sweden. 
Despite the foreseen economic losses, many analysts still expect that Canada 
will eventually ban Huawei, bending to the decision made by the U.S. 
(Wingrove 2019). When it comes to economic relationship, U.S. is the largest 
trading partner for Canada in export (247B USD), ten times larger than from 
that of second largest trading partner China (18.4B USD), showing high 
dependency on the U.S. economically. Trudeau is anticipated to make the 
decision before the upcoming elections scheduled in October; the decision is 
not likely to be reversed even after the change of the ruling party. Conservative 
Leader Andrew Scheer, who is higher in polls than Trudeau’s Liberals also 
revealed his stance on blocking Huawei (Donaldson 2019).  
  However, the Canadian government has so far not asked universities to 
stop working with Huawei (Sharma 2019). Unlike the case of the United States, 
the research collaboration with universities remained still. Huawei had 
contributed around 30 million CAD to 13 research universities in Canada and 
estimated that more than 100 professors and graduate students had worked on 
Huawei projects in Canadian universities in recent years. In 2017 Huawei said 
it would spend 10 million USD until 2020 in Canadian universities. The 
University of British Columbia in Vancouver signed in October 2017 for new 
projects and “ongoing 5G research initiative” over the consecutive three years. 
In Jan 2018, Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, accepted new research 
funding from Huawei. However, things could change if the U.S. government 
puts more pressure Canada (Sharma 2019).  
  Compared to the U.S. and Australia, Canada shows less concern over the 
security threat from China but places a strong emphasis on ensuring 
international security alliances. Within the Five Eyes network, Canada is in 
charge of SIGINT in the polar regions of Russia, taking an only supplementary 
role in intelligence collection from China. In 2017 Canada’s defense policy 
report, the word ‘China’ is mentioned only three times, unlike other countries 
in the Five Eyes network who dedicates the whole chapter for China. Canada 
briefly mentions the importance of balancing the relationship and a need to 
engage with emerging powers but does not mention China specifically. Instead, 
Canada pays most attention to the rise of activities in the Arctic region where 
issues of climate change, international trade and global security meet, and how 
to bolster its ability to operate in North and work with allies and partners. 
Although China is not the primary security concern to Canada domestically, 
U.S. led traditional alliance such as the Five Eyes, NATO and NORAD have 
significant importance in forming the defense policy of Canada.  
  Canada’s defense partnership with the U.S. is integral to continental 
security. The U.S. is Canada’s most important military ally; sharing a land 
border close to 9000 km. Canada is exercising its strategic vision for securing 
North America with the U.S. by being committed to a defense partnership in 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) that was created in 
1957. Furthermore, Canada shows a strong commitment to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) as a founding member. Canada identifies itself 
as a leadership role within NATO and prioritizes interoperability in the 
planning and capability development to cooperate with the member countries. 
With U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo warning that the U.S. might 
hold back intelligence-sharing with NATO allies if they use Huawei 
equipment for 5G network infrastructure, it is evident for Canada to make a 
decision to follow U.S.’s request in excluding Huawei.  
 
1-1-2. Confucius Institutes 
  There are 12 Confucius Institutes and 35 Confucius Classroom currently 
opened in Canada according to the Hanban website. China opened the first 
Confucius Institute in Canada in 2005 in the British Columbia Institute of 
Technology jointly with the Southwest University in China (Wu 2017). 
Confucius Institutes in Canada provides services based on the characteristics 
of each university and have shaped some unique traits. Chinese course in 
Vancouver’s Confucius Institute puts more attention to the exchange of 
economy and culture, teaching Chinese-related communication skills and 
specializing in Chinese language courses for business people. The Confucius 
Institute in Quebec set up two branch institutes at Dorothy College and the 
University of Sherbrooke, the former teaches in English and provides Chinese 
short-term training courses, while the latter teaches in French and offers 
postgraduate courses in Chinese literature, law, and medicine (Wu 2017).  
  In 2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) held a 
conference in collaboration with the Department of National Defence and 
released a report on the security threat from the rising power of China in the 
international community. The report dedicated a chapter on Confucius 
Institute, saying that the institution is more of a political entity rather than a 
cultural and language education center, and how it can be a threat to Canadian 
education. According to the report, the Confucius Institutes' primary goal was 
to project the political agendas of the Chinese Communist Party, as they are 
funded and controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Education. The report 
summarized the dangers of Confucius Institutes mainly in three: 1) Hanban, 
which provides budgets in establishment of Confucius Institute is affiliated 
with the Chinese Ministry of Education, an organization that works according 
to the Higher Education Law that is designed to uphold the ideological 
orthodoxy of “Marxism-Leninism, Deng Xiaoping Theory and Mao Zedong 
Thought; 2) teachers of Confucius Institutes are selective to spread the 
prejudicial and undemocratic idea of Chinese government and 3) Confucius 
Institutes do not allow critical discussion of topics that the Chinese 
government deems sensitive, such as the status of Tibet and Taiwan or the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre (CSIS 2013). 
  However, no direct actions, including regular inspections or law 
enactment, were taken from the government towards Confucius Institutes after 
the event. The Canadian government took a less aggressive form of response 
towards Confucius Institute, different from the governments of U.S. and 
Australia. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations’ participation 
in coercing Confucius Institute was more active than the government. 
Negative opinions were raised from academia, civilians, and media with 
several collective actions taken in these groups. Non-governmental 
participation in contending Confucius Institutes was most active in Canada 
amongst the Five Eyes nations, thus ended up being the first hosting country 
to cut ties with the Confucius Institutes on campus.  
  In 2013, the first collective action from academia was initiated. The 
Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) passed a resolution 
calling on the Canadian universities to end the relationship with Confucius 
Institutes due to the concerns over fundamentally violating academic 
independence of students and limiting the autonomy of the university 
operations. Many universities took actions after the awareness of the 
institution was raised (NAS 2017).McMaster University was the first to close 
its Confucius Institute in 2013 after Chinese counterpart refused to erase the 
clauses, which were considered to be violating human rights, in its hiring 
practices for teachers that would come to Canadian universities to teach 
students (Ghoreishi 2019). The University of Sherbrooke also canceled its 
contracts in the same year. In 2014, other actors besides school officials and 
professors joined the protest to close down Confucius institutes in the Toronto 
District School Board (Fowler 2019).  
  In April 2014, the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) signed an 
agreement with the Hanban to build the fifth Confucius Institute in Ontario 
and set to operate its programs in September. TDSB is the largest public school 
boards in Canada, with 232,000 students included. With its vast presence in 
the community, hundreds of people including students, parents, and teachers 
protested in rallies against the agreement outside the door of TDSB, to break 
the agreement. Parents of students filed a petition online with 13,000 
supporters, demanding a TDSB trustees vote to cancel a contract with 
Confucius Institute altogether, saying the partnership was not aligned to the 
community values as it restricts academic freedom and promotes political 
aims of Chinese Communist Party (Reuters 2014). In October, the TDSB 
finally voted 20 to 2 vote on ending the planned partnership with Confucius 
Institutes (Wu 2017). Most recently, New Brunswick announced to end the 
program by June 2019, saying that the program provides a restricted and one-
dimensional view of China, influencing students, so they only have a positive 
image of China. The decisions were followed by students’ complaints about 
the programs. Five students who were enrolled to the program revealed that 
saying specific topics such as Taiwan were off-limits in the classrooms, 
restricting the freedom of speech of both students and teachers who were hired 
by the Chinese government (Ghoreishi 2019). 
 
 
 List of Confucius Institutes closed in Canada by May 2019 
  A number of mainstream broadcasting companies, including Canadian 
public media CBC reported negative news on Confucius Institute continuously, 
excluding the efforts or amendments made in the contracts by the Chinese 
counterpart to deal with the previously raised conflicts. In addition to the 
mainstream media coverage, the documentary ‘In the Name of Confucius’ was 
filmed in Canada in 2017, exposing the controversies surrounding the 
Confucius Institutes. It was the first documentary film dealing with Confucius 
Institutes featuring the exclusive personal story of Sonia Zhao, a former 
Confucius Institute teacher, whose defection initiated the debate on 
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establishing Confucius Institute in TDBS in 2013. In the Name of Confucius 
has won a number of international awards and nominations, including 
Outstanding Achievement Award of Humanitarian at the IndieFEST Film 
Awards. As of August 2018, it has successfully screened in 12 countries, 
including screenings in the parliaments of the United Kingdom and New South 
Wales (Doris 2018). The film screening took place in all Five Eyes member 
countries, mostly in places where Confucius Institutes were already 
controversial. This film has been used as one of the evidence for both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations to back up their opinion 
how Confucius Institute pose a threat to the society, alongside the loss of 
academic integrity, violations to human rights codes, and even potential 
infringements on national security (Doris 2016). 
  Compared to the U.S. and Australia, where coercive actions towards 
Confucius Institutes are stronger by the governmental entities, Canada’s 
responses mainly comes from the public. Although Canadian Intelligence 
agencies have conducted several seminars and prepared reports on the dangers 
of institutions, government’s role remained relatively small. Instead, 
collective actions were taken by the academics, communities, and media that 
have caused to shut down the Confucius Institutes. According to the national 
opinion poll of Asia-Pacific Foundations, more than 60 percent of respondents 
have shown concerns over the cultural influence from Asia, mainly from 
China. Also, they expressed more significant opposition with adding Asian 
language courses in public schools, which was demonstrated as an example in 
TDBS (Wu 2017). Concerns were less about the security but instead focused 
on academic freedom and human rights violation, that invoked public 
opposition to the institution.   
 
4. On the Fence 
 
1-1. New Zealand 
 
1-1-1. Response to China 
  New Zealand had previously announced to exclude Huawei’s 
participation in the 5G network, along with Australia, but has taken its words 
back saying no final decisions are made. In New Zealand, any 
telecommunication provider that wants to adopt new technology to the 
network has to notify New Zealand’s government security agency and undergo 
an assessment under the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and 
Security) Act 2013 (TICSA). In November 2018, GCSB blocked New 
Zealand’s major mobile company Spark’s proposal on using Huawei 
equipment in its 5G upgrade, citing national security risks. GCSB Minister 
Andrew Little said the decision was made as the technology itself was too 
risky, and it had nothing to do with Huawei being Chinese company (RNZ 
2018). 
  Despite the efforts to disassociate the ban with the ongoing U.S.-led 
coercion on a Chinese company, the announcement was quickly followed by 
an intense backlash from China. Huawei responded by conducting an 
advertising campaign in newspapers, internet websites, and billboards across 
New Zealand with the slogan “5G without Huawei is like rugby without New 
Zealand” (Manhire 2019). Chinese state media Global Times published an 
article alleging it had been “stabbed in the back," and Chinese tourists are 
abandoning their travel plans to ‘punish’ New Zealand over the ban (Burton-
Bradely 2019). A few days later a state visit by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
was delayed. Furthermore, the launch of tourism initiative ‘2019 China-New 
Zealand year of tourism’ was postponed by Beijing abruptly despite being 
planned for years (Wibawa 2019). 
  To stop Sino-NZ relationship from further deteriorating, the New 
Zealand government has been actively engaged to recover the damage in the 
relationship. Prime Minister made an announcement in February 2019 that 
there was a misreporting by the government, and it was not true that Huawei 
has been ruled out in the 5G competition. She added that New Zealand makes 
its decision independently of the Five Eyes and Huawei could still be involved 
if Spark can satisfy the GCSB’s concerns (Westcott 2019).  
  While its closest ally Australia is facing the similar dilemma of balancing 
security relations with its traditional partners amid economic dependence on 
China, New Zealand has taken a different approach in dealing with the 
problem, being a smaller nation with a different set of geopolitical priorities. 
In 2017, a Chinese-born member of parliament Jian Yang was investigated by 
New Zealand’s intelligence service. He has been MP for National party since 
2011 and was accused of his links to Chinese intelligence service as his 
background on 15 years working at elite Chinese military training academies 
was revealed. However, Prime Minister Bill English defended his party’s MP, 
saying he was aware of Yang’s background and there is no doubt on his loyalty 
to New Zealand (BBC 2017). Such response from the government was in 
contrast to that of Australia when Labor Senator Sam Dastyari was pressured 
to resign after his allegations of links to the Chinese government. The Foreign 
Influence Transparency Scheme Act was enacted in Australia the following 
year to keep Chinese influence in its domestic politics, disregarding the fierce 
criticism from Beijing. However, Wellington remained reluctant to speak 
publicly on the issue, fearing it could damage the commercial ties with China, 
as it seeks to upgrade its free trade agreement deal (Smyth 2017).  
  Despite sharing similar geopolitical conditions with Australia, New 
Zealand has been more reluctant to counter the perceived threat from China. 
Such a difference is coming from differing overall capabilities of the two 
nations. Based on 2019 Asia Power Index formulated by Lowy Institute, 
Australia ranked 7th, and New Zealand ranked 12th, below Indonesia, for 
overall power. The gap is wider for military capability, where Australia ranked 
8th, and New Zealand ranked 15th. Also, according to global firepower, 
Australia ranked 19th, while New Zealand ranked 87th for 2019 Military 
Strength Ranking. With larger capabilities and geopolitical importance, 
Australia has been actively engaging in regional initiatives and exerted its 
influence in the region. For example, Australia has been hosting numerous and 
major initiatives with ASEAN member states, including ASEAN-Australia 
Forum, ASEAN-Australia Special Summit. Such level of assertion and 
initiatives with the regional countries cannot be found in New Zealand. New 
Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 states that its direct 
interest is ‘stability on the Antarctic continent and in the Southern Ocean.' The 
Policy statement also recognizes recent development in the region caused by 
the tension between the U.S. and China. However, New Zealand remains 
relatively silent on taking countermeasures due to its limited capabilities 
 New Zealand's economic dependence on China is another reason for its 
protracted approach. According to government statistics in 2019, about 19% 
of total two-way trade is from China (31.24B NZD out of 165.55B NZD) and 
has a trade surplus of 5.06 billion NZD while overall surplus for New Zealand 
remains at 1.67 billion NZD. It suggests that China is not only the largest 
trading partner, but also it is the largest source of trade surplus. Also, China is 
the 2nd largest source of tourist and the largest source of international students 
in New Zealand. These statistics show how New Zealand is economically 
vulnerable to China once the bilateral relations face risks.    
 
1-1-2. Confucius Institutes 
  Unlike previous nations, the Confucius Institute has been welcomed by 
the government and used as a symbol of deepened NZ-China relations. 
Currently, there are three Confucius Institute and 30 Confucius Classroom 
operating in New Zealand. The first Confucius Institute opened in March 2007 
by University of Auckland co-held with Fudan University as a Chinese 
institution. It also received the Pioneer awards, which was given to only ten 
universities amongst five hundred Confucius Institutes worldwide (TNSG 
2017). Joint Forum on One Belt One Road initiative was co-organized with 
the New Zealand China Council. Consul General Xu Erwen gave an opening 
speech at the Welcome Dinner for the joint forum and stressed the importance 
of the Confucius Institutes as it plays a crucial role in promoting bilateral 
cultural exchanges and cooperation, and it has been a great success so far.  
   In 2018, the University of Auckland Confucius Institute was announced 
as one of the most successful Confucius Institute globally and awarded the 
status of a Model Confucius Institute, the only Model Institute in Australasia. 
Alongside the launch of the Model Confucius Institute, the University of 
Auckland and Fudan University also signed the MOU to establish the Fudan-
UoA Centre for China Studies in Oceania. The Centre is expected to foster 
multi-disciplinary collaborations between academics at Fudan and Auckland 
with an ambition to collaborate with other universities in the Oceania region 
and in China (TNSG 2017). 
  On the other hand, scholars from two other hosting universities have 
criticized the operation of the Confucius Institutes. In 2017, Victoria 
University had co-established Confucius Institute by receiving 360,000 NZD 
from Beijing, which was more than half of the programs total budget of 
620,000 NZD. Duncan Campbell, a professor at Victoria University School of 
Language and Cultures, said funding received from the Chinese government 
was inappropriate, and school should be using the money in the more proper 
study of China. He further described Confucius Institute as outsourcing New 
Zealand’s education on the Chinese Communist Party. Professor Anne-Marie 
Brady at Canterbury University also said that because all of New Zealand 
universities are public, New Zealand citizens are paying for the Chinese 
government to spread its agenda overseas.  
  In September 2018, Professor Brady also wrote an open letter to protect 
her, addressed to Prime Minister Jacinda co-signed by other professors and 
various human rights organizations, including Amnesty International New 
Zealand (Amman 2018). In the open letter, she revealed that she had been a 
target of a sustained harassment campaign by Chinese agents, related to her 
academic work on overseas influence campaigns by the Chinese government. 
She wrote that her house and office on campus were broken into twice and her 
car was sabotaged. She added that the thief or thieves at her home had stolen 
her cell phone and laptop that was cheap and old, ignoring valuables in her 
house (Graham-McLay 2019). A second open letter was published in 
December 2018, co-signed by 169 academics, journalists and politicians all 
around the world calling on New Zealand government to protect her and speak 
up in support of academic freedom (Amman 2018). An investigation was 
conducted by New Zealand police, for seven months with Interpol and New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) involved. However, the 
investigation ended in February 2019, failing to determine the culprit 
(Graham- McLay 2019).  
  Meanwhile, the politicians were more reserve about the incident. While 
the investigation was still ongoing, the Prime Minister said it would not be 
appropriate for her to comment on an active police investigation, through her 
spokesperson (Graham- McLay 2019). National Party Education 
spokeswoman Nikki Kaye responded to the open letter that there need to be 
specific examples of the erosion of academic freedom. She also said it was not 
unusual for other countries’ government to fund foreign language teaching, 
citing the cases of France and Japan (Walters 2018).  
 
1-2. United Kingdom 
 
1-2-1. Response to China 
  The United Kingdom is leaning towards accepting Huawei to supply 5G 
infrastructure with partial restriction, despite pressure by its closest ally on 
security ground. The approach of the British government on this issue was 
initially planned to be secretive until April 2019 when the newspaper 
Telegraph reported that the cabinet decided to allow Huawei in building its 
infrastructures next generation of communication technology. After the reveal, 
Prime Minister Theresa May dismissed her defence minister Gavin 
Williamson over a leak of discussion in the National Security Council 
(Euractic 2019). It appears that the initial plan of the government was to keep 
the decision as a secret in the National Security Council and inform the U.S. 
when the 2020 presidential campaign starts off. The attempt was to minimize 
the risk of a future trade deal between the U.S. and U.K., as president Trump 
will be more distracted by domestic politics (Kabasi 2019).  
  After the leakage, the British government announced that Huawei could 
provide equipment for non-core parts of the network. Even though Huawei 
kits cannot be used in the core parts of the network, Huawei expressed support 
for the government saying they were pleased with the UK’s evidence-based 
approach to the issue and they will continue to work cooperatively with the 
government and the industry (Merriman 2019). 
  The UK was the first major nations in Europe to welcome China’s 
telecommunication equipment. In 2005, BT Group signed a contract with 
Huawei to supply telephone switches, including other infrastructure buildings. 
As of 2019, BT, O2, and Vodafone, three of the most prominent phone carriers 
in the U.K. used Huawei equipment in existing 4G networks (Woo 2018). The 
National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) mentioned cybersecurity risks in its 
annual report and said there were some defects found in the Huawei equipment. 
However, the report concluded saying that NCSC does not believe the defects 
identified as the result of Chinese state interference, and the problems found 
are manageable. The findings of this report stand in contrast to that of other 
Five Eyes’ intelligence agencies, legitimizing the actions of the British 
government to disregard U.S. concerns (Porter 2019).  
  On May 31, EE, a unit of BT launched UK’s first 5G network using 
Huawei’s wireless antenna in six cities: London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast, 
Birmingham, and Manchester. EE’s CEO Marc Allera said that Huawei was 
essential in its rollout of 5G in the U.K. (Yelin, Zhangqi 2019). Another 
operating company Three UK also announced to cooperate with Huawei to 
launch 5G networks till August along with offering Huawei Mate X 5G 
handsets in their product lines, which EE and Vodafone temporarily stopped 
supplying after the U.S. listed Huawei on their blacklist (Artashyan 2019). 
  While the U.S. government was recommending its universities to cut 
research partnership with Huawei, the British government did not take any 
measures. After the security concerns were raised, the University of Oxford 
banned further research grants from Huawei, but a number of universities in 
the U.K. have reiterated their commitment to Huawei contracts. Seventeen 
universities, including the University of Edinburgh, the University of Surrey, 
Imperial College London and others, chose to receive funding from Huawei 
continuously. This was primarily contributed by the Brexit, where universities 
stand to lose substantial EU research funding, thus finding China as their new 
research partners (Sharma, 2019). 
  Current attitudes of UK towards China, especially the case of Huawei 
leak reflects the growing importance of China as a partner for post-Brexit 
Britain. At the moment, China is not the largest trading partner of the U.K., 
unlike the case in the U.S., Australia, or New Zealand. China (58.9B USD) is 
placed fifth in UK’s export destination, behind U.S. (45.2B USD), Germany 
(38.6B USD), the Netherlands (24.9B USD) and France (24.8B USD). 
Chinese investment in the U.K. is minimal, less than one percent of current 
stocks (Brown 2019). However, with China’s desire in the U.K.'s expertise in 
financial and corporate governance, the post-Brexit trade relations; especially 
in the service area is expected to grow. Bilateral FTA agreement will also be 
arranged after the departure from the EU is completed, implying the deeper 
economic relationship with China (Kuo 2018). Also, the long-delayed 
connection between London and Shanghai stock exchange were finally 
established in June 2019 to facilitate access between the two robust stock 
markets (Hancock and Kynge and Espinoza and Parker 2019).   
  Although the U.S. is the most important ally for the U.K. as mentioned 
in the UK’s white paper, the U.K. had taken different positions than the U.S. 
in relationship with China, before Huawei became a more significant issue. In 
2015, the U.K. joined the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as the 
first major G7 member, disappointing the U.S., as European countries 
including France and Germany joined AIIB followed the UK’s suit. Beijing is 
also hoping the UK to take a similar initiative for the Belt and Road Initiative 
(Kuo 2018).  
 As the Brexit deadline is approaching, the UK is preparing for 
reclaimed autonomy along with challenges over its trade policy. Under article 
207 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the EU exclusively 
reserves the right to manage its trade and investment relations with non-EU 
jurisdiction. In other words, the individual member states, such as the UK, do 
not have the power to create its own trade laws or agreements. Such autonomy 
over the trade policy is one of the freedoms that Brexiteer’s promised (Berry 
2019). While Theresa May’s withdrawal deal with EU 27 could potentially 
restrict this autonomy (Boffey and Rankin, 2018), Boris Johnson, the most 
likely candidate for a next prime minister and the hardline Brexiteer is less 
likely to compromise Britain’s autonomy over its trade policy.  
Autonomy comes with a consequence. The U.K. will no longer be a 
member of the EU Customs Union, losing all of its preferential status within 
the EU. This not only means that the UK's future import and export will be 
harmed but also means that the UK has to put considerable efforts to sign new 
trade agreements with both EU and Non-EU countries. These circumstances 
will lead the UK to find a new trading partner who is large enough to 
compensate for the loss of an EU market. China seems to be the best candidate 
for the UK, considering its market size and the UK's less reliance on the 
Chinese market.  
The UK is less concerned about the ongoing security threat by China and 
more concerned about Russia. Even within the Five Eyes, the UK is the only 
country that is not located in the Asia-Pacific, and it has been responsible for 
Africa and former Soviet Union west of the Urals (Richelson 2012). Although 
it announced to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific, the UK remains at 
the sideline. The UK is not a member of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 
Plus, the ASEAN-led security consultative body, and its bid for observership 
is not going smooth. However, the Royal Navy in September 2018 conducted 
Freedom of Navigation Operation on the contested water of South China Sea, 
which reaffirmed the UK’s security commitment in the region along with the 
US (Tuan 2018). 
However, the UK’s commitment was partially revoked after China’s 
protest. In February 2019, the Royal Navy announced to deploy its new 
aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, along with two squadrons of F-35B to 
the contested waters of South China Sea. China immediately responded by 
canceling the prearranged trade talk with Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip 
Hammond. Later, in a BBC radio program, Hammond addressed the concern 
from Chinese and labeled the deployment as ‘premature' in an effort to ease 
China (Zhou 2019). Kerry Brown, director of the Lau China Institute, also 
emphasized in his article in 2019 that the UK can no longer risk the 
relationship with China as it did in 2012 when former Prime Minister David 
Cameroon met Dalai Lama. Under these circumstances, the UK is less 
concerned about China’s threat and views China as an economic opportunity 
for the future. It is comprehensible for the UK to be lenient on both Huawei 
and Confucius Institutes.    
 
1-2-2. Confucius Institutes 
  There are 29 Confucius Institutes in universities and 157 Confucius 
Classrooms in the United Kingdom with the second highest number in the 
world next to the United States (Doris 2018). Confucius Institutes in the U.K. 
were more welcomed than contained. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron 
encouraged to learn Chinese, instead of French and German, which are the 
traditional second language options for British students (Han 2015). 
According to the BBC report on Chinese language speakers in 2014, only 1% 
of the UK’s adult population could speak Chinese fluently.  
  Elizabeth Truss, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, stressed the needs for 
the change saying China’s growing economy brings business opportunities for 
the U.K. and it is vital that more young people should be able to speak 
Mandarin to be able to expose them to the global market and develop 
successful companies (ICEF 2014). John Worne, Director of strategy at the 
British Council, UK’s own government-sponsored language and cultural 
center, agreed to Truss’s idea that Chinese is one of the most important 
languages for the UK’s future. He also said the number of students learning 
the language needs to grow faster for the students to move on to the world’s 
stage. In addition, the Confederation of British Industry announced that 
Mandarin was the second to the French as the language British employers 
most wanted to see in their future employees (ICEF 2014).  
  With the growing importance of China in the U.K., no recognizable 
conflicts occurred between the Confucius Institutes and hosting schools, 
unlike in most Five Eyes nations. No movements were formed by the 
government to scrutinize the organization. However, in February 2019, The 
Conservative Party Human Rights Commission has raised a question on 
Confucius Institute for the first time as continuous coercive actions were taken 
by the U.S. The Conservative Party Human Rights Commission has published 
a report suggesting British schools to suspend further partnerships with 
Confucius Institute until a review on the institutes was completed (Cheng 
2019).  
  Most of the arguments from the report were backed up by the evidence 
found in schools from the United States, Australia, and Canada that has been 
hawkish towards Confucius Institutes, rather than focusing on the U.K.’s cases. 
Although the Commission made a recommendation to the government to pass 
laws requiring transparency from Confucius Institutes, no official statement 
or criticism was made by the government, and no universities terminated the 





  As Confucius Institute expands its presence over the world, different 
responses from hosting nations were observed. Even the Five Eyes member 
states, who share common Anglo-American values with a developed economy, 
have shown diverging attitudes toward the Chinese language and cultural 
institution. Also, regarding the ongoing controversies over adopting Huawei 
equipment in the rollout of the 5G network, the Five Eyes nations made 
different policy decisions as well. Despite the U.S.’s effort to convince its 
allies to join the anti-Huawei movement by accusing Huawei of the conduit of 
espionage, countries took different positions based on its comprehensive 
threats analysis including security and economic risks. It proves that even the 
Five Eyes nations have differing perception toward China; based on this 
observation, this paper suggests that the Five Eyes nations’ response to 
Confucius Institutes and Huawei equipment adoption are positively correlated.  
        The governments those have banned Huawei equipment were most 
hawkish to Confucius Institutes, enacting of laws directly aiming the 
organization. The United States had the most robust containment policy 
towards the Confucius Institutes. Various governmental agencies published 
reports condemning the Confucius Institutes by pointing out its linkage with 
the Chinese government. An amendment to The National Defense 
Authorization Act was passed in 2018 that banned universities with Confucius 
Institutes from receiving Pentagon funding, which contributed to terminating 
several partnerships with Hanban. The number of the State Department led 
field site reviews were also doubled from last year, followed by the heightened 
tension between the U.S. and China.  
        Australia also commenced The Foreign Influence Transparency 
Scheme Act in 2018 to monitor Confucius Institutes. In the same year, the 
New South Wales Government postponed the programs in Confucius 
Classrooms and reviewed the schools to find inappropriate influence from the 
Chinese government. It correlates with the Australian government’s increasing 
alignment towards the United States.  
        The Canadian government is under a category of ‘likely to ban’ 
towards Huawei and has shown mild-aggression to Confucius Institutes. The 
Department of National Defence held the conference with the CSIS on 
security on the security threat from China’s rising power and defined the 
Confucius Institute as a political entity projecting agendas of the Chinese 
Communist Party. However, the government’s role remained relatively 
minimal compared to the governments in ‘ban in effect’ category, with no 
regular inspections or law enactments taken place. Instead, the more 
aggressive response was raised from the public with collective actions 
organized by non-state actors including academics, mainstream media, and 
parent organizations, which led to the first closure of the Confucius Institutes.  
        Confucius Institutes established in the ‘on the fence’ nations were 
more welcomed than contained. Although New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom have a different type of relationship with China, both governments 
positively view the Confucius Institutes and even attempt to appease negative 
public sentiment towards China. The New Zealand government has been 
utilizing the Confucius Institutes as a platform to enhance a bilateral 
relationship with China as its economy is highly dependent on China. The U.K. 
government has emphasized the importance of Chinese language learning, as 
it considering China as a prominent economic partner for the post-Brexit era.  
  
 Security Concern Huawei Confucius Institute 
United States High, consider China as 
the strategic competitor 
Ban in 
Effect 
Hostile, enactment of law, 
conduct regular inspections 
against CI 
Australia High, aligned with the 
U.S. to counter China’s 
influence in Asia-Pacific 
Ban in 
Effect 
Hostile, enactment of law, 
conduct regular inspections 
against CI 
Canada Moderate, put emphasizes 
on the Western values, but 
less intention to involve 
Likely to 
Ban 
Mild, expressed concern towards 
CI but lacks substantive action 
New Zealand Moderate, Concerns about 





Positive, utilize CI as a platform 
to facilitate bilateral relations with 
China, acts to appease negative 
public sentiments towards CI 
United 
Kingdom 
Low, geographically far 
away from China and 
more concerned about 
Russia, consider China as 




Positive, Put emphasis on the 
Chinese language education, no 
negative actions by the 
government 
 
* Table 1-1. Five Eyes’ responses towards Huawei and the Confucius Institutes 
 
 Dashed arrow: Chinese Government’s accused influence 
Width of arrow: Level of perceived security threat 
* Figure 1-1. Summary in diagram  
        The Confucius Institutes did contribute to Chinese language 
education and enhanced bilateral relation between China and hosting countries. 
However, no matter how their curriculums are tightly controlled, the institutes 
are assessed based on the government-to-government relations rather than its 
actual contribution to the public. As security tension between the U.S. and 
China deepens, countries will be forced to take a side, and the changing 
attitude towards the Confucius institutes will be the first signal to this 
adjustment.  
2. Limitation 
        As a measure to determine the level of the perceived security threat 
from China, the attitude taken towards the adoption of Huawei equipment was 
used as a standard to categorize nations into three groups. However, this paper 
was written when the United States and China were in the middle of a trade 
war, with constant updates made by two countries which possibly have 
influenced other government’s decisions on Huawei adoption. Huawei dispute 
is still an ongoing issue, with many countries undecided on which policy to 
take. While we have used the Huawei barometer provided by the Bloomberg 
in 2018, to reduce the level of uncertainty, but it is also a prediction made by 
the analysts, which is prone to change in accordance to the actions taken by 
the U.S. or China. For instance, New Zealand was initially categorized in the 
‘likely to ban’ category and was moved in this paper as the New Zealand 
government changed its stance after the economic retaliation by the Chinese 
government. As an ongoing issue, new reports were mainly referenced to infer 
the stance of the government, and since the government statements and the 
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